The Republic of Sudan is suffering a catastrophic famine. The entire country is in food crisis or food emergency. In July 2024, the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) declared famine in the Zamzam camp for internally displaced people in North Darfur, near El Fasher; between 500,000 to 800,000 people live in the camp.1 The IPC also reported that 755,000 people in Sudan would be ‘in catastrophe’ (IPC phase 5) in the period to September 2024, while 25.6 million people face crisis conditions, the worst levels of food security ever recorded by the IPC in Sudan.2 The significant humanitarian crisis affecting Sudan has been greatly exacerbated by the current civil war in which the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) have been fighting against the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Hunger is being used as a weapon by both sides.
Every humanitarian crisis eventually gives rise to a set of ‘lessons learned’, often set out in the relevant evaluations. But there is also the possibility of ‘lessons not learned’, the title of an article on peacekeeping by Mats Berdal.3 It is true that the relevant lessons are often far from obvious or agreed upon. But it is clear that some important lessons from past crises are not being sufficiently taken into account as one crisis gives way to another. We should also recognise that it is not just humanitarians who are trying to learn lessons from humanitarian crises: those who manipulate and even promote these crises are also learning lessons about how best to do so. An important question here is: who is learning fastest? The immediate and longer-term survival of Sudan’s people depends on concerned governments learning lessons more quickly than abusive armed groups. Another concern is that the practice of ‘learning lessons’ may itself have become a kind of ritual that insures the humanitarian system against the charge of complacency while the system itself does not change very much.
This brief provides humanitarian organisations with key information about the background to the current civil war in Sudan and the factors that have had a role in creating famine. The brief also looks at responses to the humanitarian crisis, highlighting reasons for civilians not having adequate protection and reasons why relief has been inadequate. The brief sets out opportunities to push against the obstacles or constraints to humanitarian relief. The brief and the key considerations have been informed from consultations with experts active in or knowledgeable about the history of Sudan and humanitarian work in Sudan, the author’s own expertise, and academic and grey literature.
Key considerations
- Pressure the warring parties and their supporters to stop making a famine. It is important to recognise that in Sudan today – as in many civil wars in the past – famine is not so much a by-product of war as a weapon of war.
- Increase pressure on countries supporting the warring parties, including the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Russia, in order to address the international trading and military supplies that are sustaining warring parties.
- Hold the warring parties to account for multiple breaches of human rights law and humanitarian law. There is an urgent need to recognise that both sides have been creating famine as well as an urgent need for strong pressure on the warring parties’ international backers. Firm action is needed to hold leaders to account for war crimes, including the crime of making a famine. Frank and coordinated statements on breaches of humanitarian and human rights law – and on the inadequacy of current humanitarian responses – are essential.
- Push for a holistic response to the famine and war. The response should include an increase in diplomatic pressure on the supporters of the warring parties with a view to reining in human rights abuses, greatly improving humanitarian access and ultimately ending the war. There should be an increase in protection efforts from the UN (as opposed to simply humanitarian aid), including the deployment of ‘an independent and impartial force with a mandate to safeguard civilians’ as recommended by the independent fact-finding mission established by the UN Human Rights Council. There is also a need for greatly increased humanitarian relief using multiple cross-border points. This is a human rights crisis, and it needs a diplomatic solution. At the moment, even aid is falling catastrophically short of needs.
- Address the broader causes of food insecurity. Food security was getting worse even before the war broke out. Different combinations of factors are producing food insecurity and famine in different areas. Any moves towards peace will need strong and immediate financial support.
- Push at the obstacles and ‘constraints’ to a better humanitarian response. Constraints are not necessarily binding. Funding needs to be increased immediately, and security constraints need to be challenged. Cash can overcome some security constraints.
- Increase relief to tackle escalating food scarcity, which is already fuelling violence. Alongside the mantra that aid should ‘do no harm’, it is important to recognise the insecurity that lack of aid
- Push for full and accurate information about the amount of aid delivered in relation to needs, the obstacles to meeting the needs and how these obstacles can best be dealt with. One important step would be a clearer recognition of the existence of famine by concerned governments and UN agencies in particular, building on the report from the IPC which recognised famine in Zamzam camp for internally displaced people in July 2024.
- Increase cash distribution. This should be done alongside increased food supplies to guard against inflation. Cash can reach areas and people that food may not.
- Increase support for local non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Support needs to be flexible and reliable, and it needs to be combined with an international presence to help protect local aid workers from retaliation.
The roots of hunger and war
In the current civil war in Sudan, which began in April 2023, the SAF under Abdel Fattah al-Burhan has been fighting against the RSF under Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as General Hemedti). With an element of understatement, Sudanese scholar Magdi el Gizouli notes that ‘describing it as a war between two generals might not give a true sense of its depth and spread’.4
‘Divide and rule’ for power
Sudan has long had a hunger-producing political economy, with the geographical peripheries subject to neglect and to an exploitative trading and export system – a system that has been policed by periodic violence.5 Over several decades, governments in Sudan’s capital Khartoum have deployed militia violence against a variety of rebellions in a pattern that has been called ‘counterinsurgency on the cheap’.6 Meanwhile, there have been emergency food aid operations every year since 1984. These operations have been largely ineffective in promoting food security with the significant exception of major international relief to Darfur in the early 2000s.7 Despite ruling what has sometimes been called a ‘failed state’, Omar al Bashir succeeded in keeping power as Sudan’s head of state for three decades (1989 to 2019) in ‘divide and rule’ mode.5,8 The habit of turning one aggrieved group against another had been cemented before al Bashir when the famine between 1986 and 1988 resulted, in large part, from government-sponsored raiding on the Dinka by Baggara Arab groups who had themselves been politically and economically marginalised. This was a form of licensed looting and even enslavement in the service of counterinsurgency and depopulating oil-rich areas.9–13
Armed militias
The Omar al Bashir government encouraged and armed militias among Arab pastoralist groups – often land-poor – alongside an intensifying racialised discourse that positioned groups such as the Masalit, Fur and Zaghawa in Darfur as ‘African’ rather than Arab. The militias, known as Janjaweed, later formed the basis for the RSF, a government-affiliated militia of dubious loyalty that was formally incorporated into the Sudan government in 2013. What emerged was a kind of ‘dual military structure divided between aggressive, mobile militias and static, garrison forces’14; importantly, this division remains a characteristic of the civil war in Sudan, with more mobile RSF fighters controlling much of the countryside while the SAF controls garrisons in fixed positions.14
It proved much easier to mobilise the Janjaweed militias than to demobilise them. Over many years, in a striking example of what Alex de Waal has called ‘the political marketplace’,15 the RSF under Hemedti used the threat of disloyalty to consolidate their influence and to cement Hemedti’s personal power and wealth, extracting more and more concessions from the Sudan government.15,16 Eventually, the RSF became sufficiently powerful and well-resourced that it was able to rival the Sudanese army itself, a rivalry that culminated in the current civil war from April 2023. As Berridge and colleagues note, Sudan has been ‘reaping the whirlwind’ of a long-standing militia strategy.15
Emergence of ‘shadow states’
The RSF was able to launder its reputation – and attract resources – through its involvement in border control as part of the Khartoum Process (a European Union-Horn of Africa migration control project), though the European Union denies directly funding the RSF.17,18 The RSF also moved into sesame and livestock exports, narcotics, stolen goods, extortion, bank take-overs and, crucially, gold.4,14,19 Even as gold became Sudan’s main export in terms of value, most of the exports were ‘off the books’ and did not contribute to the treasury or the official balance of payments.20 The gold trade boosted warlord power in relation to the central government in Khartoum, particularly with the fall in the oil revenues that were accruing to the central government. The army, too, was controlling more and more economic activities, including gold.20 What was emerging was a kind of ‘shadow state’21 – or, in a sense, two shadow states – with the army and the RSF both building up their own economic base while depriving the treasury of revenue. ‘Privatisation’ encouraged the creation of corporate fronts, and international sanctions boosted profits for those able to breach them.16
Economic crisis
Apart from the sanctions, the treasury was reeling from loss of oil revenues after the secession of South Sudan in 2011. Spending on development and healthcare suffered, and the government printed money to fund essential imports (including wheat), further boosting inflation. A 2016 currency crash hit imports and pushed food prices even higher. When growing food insecurity fuelled protests in urban areas, the RSF was deployed against protesters.
Significantly, as austerity deepened and the social welfare functions of the state were further eroded, the RSF was able to extend its power and influence by offering itself as a kind of ‘safety valve’ – often a violent one – for those who were struggling with inflation, austerity, poor services and poor employment prospects. As increasing numbers of people fell into debt, the RSF sometimes offered to relieve the debt.4 In short, the RSF was feeding off crisis and scarcity – as it has continued to do in wartime.
Government transition (2019)
President al Bashir was ejected from power in 2019 following a peaceful popular uprising that split the army. A transitional government was then established under Prime Minister Abdallah Hamdok. But Hamdok struggled to balance the books or to solidify his government with quick improvements in living standards.
International financial support is essential for stabilising peace and democratic transitions, while radical economic reforms that increase poverty are extremely dangerous.22 This was a clear lesson from Sri Lanka’s failed 2002 to 2005 peace process, for example.23 Yet, in a notable example of ‘lessons not learned’, poor support for Hamdok and pressure to pay international debts encouraged currency devaluation (and cuts in food and fuel subsidies), undermining any ‘democracy dividend’ and eroding popular support. Such processes were not adequately compensated by the World Bank’s short-lived Sudan Family Support Program (the Thamarat Program), which in any case ended with the October 2021 military coup.
Military coup (October 2021) and subsequent civil war (April 2023)
Threatened by democratisation, the RSF and SAF joined forces in an October 2021 military coup, alongside some former Darfur rebel leaders returning from Libya.14,24 But the RSF and SAF soon fell out, with the RSF resisting quick integration into the national army and tensions escalating into civil war from April 2023.24,25 Also contributing to RSF/SAF tensions was Hemedti’s ‘outsider’ status in Khartoum: ‘enforcers’ from the geographical periphery had previously deferred to central riverain elites (centred on the Nile and traditionally dominating government) while keeping a much lower profile in the capital.4,15,26,27
The RSF had military experience not only in Darfur from the early 2000s but also in Yemen. Members of the RSF fought in Yemen (peaking in 2016 to 2017) in the Saudi-led coalition, which also had support from the United Arab Emirates, the United States of America (USA) and the United Kingdom. Again, violence was easier to stir up than to calm down, and taking over the state offered an outlet for restless and battle-hardened returning fighters who were not easily demobilised.4
Collusion can be an important part of warfare.28,29 In Sudan, de Waal notes that the RSF has bribed some SAF officers, some of whom have switched sides rather than fighting.30 Conflicts between warlords may become an enduring stand-off in which each side exploits civilians in their respective areas, often with external support for a partial dismemberment of the state. While fighting is currently bitter, the RSF and SAF may also be tempted to divide power territorially, influenced in part by their shared interest in continuing to derail Sudan’s revolution.4 Tom Perriello, the USA’s Special Envoy for Sudan, has noted that elements linked to the former al Bashir regime see continued war as insulation from a democratic process.31
Creating famine
People in Sudan have been suffering from several famines amidst a larger and more widespread pattern of extreme food insecurity. The World Food Programme, in December 2023, reported that 18 million people were facing acute hunger.32 Darfur has been very badly hit by war and famine. There is extreme deprivation in RSF-controlled areas and urban areas under siege. In North Darfur, El Fasher is under siege, its population swelled with people escaping fighting from surrounding areas, including from the camps for internally displaced people at Tawila, Kutum and Kassab.24 Also badly affected are RSF-controlled areas around Khartoum and Gezira. Towns and cities have expanded due to rural violence,14 fuelling urban price rises. Neighbouring countries are also in emergency – Chad, Ethiopia and South Sudan.
Major economic crisis
Sudan was experiencing a major economic crisis, driven by a range of factors (see Box 1), even before the current civil war from April 2023. This war, and longer running conflicts like the one in Darfur (since 2003), have greatly worsened the economic crisis.
Box 1. Factors driving Sudan’s economic crisis
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Source: Author’s own. Sources cited.
War driving famine
The current civil war is the biggest factor driving famine, with areas of most intense famine correlating closely with the violence. Violence has brought intense suffering to particular areas, such as Darfur, Kordofan and Gezira.
The RSF’s military experience helped it to make quick gains in the war from April 2023 – taking most of Khartoum then much of Darfur and Kordofan and then Gezira state.26 In May 2023, the RSF consolidated control of much of Darfur in association with various Arab militias.
Most of the areas that have the greatest need for food and other elements of emergency relief are RSF-controlled areas or urban areas being besieged by the RSF. The RSF-controlled areas are subject to widespread looting by the RSF, and the SAF is restricting movement of food into these areas. The movement of food into urban areas is generally restricted by the RSF.33 In Darfur, hunger is also rampant in areas held by Abdel Wahid al-Nur (leader of the Sudan Liberation Movement/Army), centred on Jebel Marra.24
War has drastically undermined the revenue of the state,20 something that will feed the strategy of ‘counterinsurgency on the cheap’6 and may deepen the current use of starvation as a weapon.
Hunger as a weapon of war
In past crises, whether in Sudan or elsewhere, famine has often been seen as a by-product of war. But this tends to obscure the degree to which hunger is a weapon of war. Today in Sudan, famine is very much a weapon of war and it has identifiable economic functions too.7,9,34–36 The famine and the war have deep roots in Sudanese society and in the manipulation of scarcity by those who are prepared to use violence to survive, both politically and economically.
Both the RSF and the SAF have helped to create the famine. The criminal nature of this enterprise was underlined in 2018 by UN Security Council resolution 2417 and its condemnation, more generally, of starvation as a weapon of war, including the unlawful denial of humanitarian access. Without a very much more substantial diplomatic and aid initiative, Sudan will sink further into the scarcity that fuels violence, that fosters tactics of ‘divide and rule’ and that encourages the use of famine as both a weapon and a way of appropriating resources.
The SAF has resorted to using starvation as a weapon against the extensive RSF-controlled areas. The International Crisis Group reports not only that hunger in Darfur is greatest in RSF-controlled areas but also that the army (SAF) has largely denied the UN permission to deliver assistance.26 De Waal notes of the SAF, ‘starvation is the cheapest and most effective weapon and they will not give it up easily’.33 An onerous system of government ‘clearances’ has impeded deliveries to RSF-controlled areas in particular, with each truck needing permission.24 Government control is cemented by the fact that almost all humanitarian relief comes through Port Sudan. Local officials have sometimes blocked deliveries so as to prioritise their own populations, and government authorities have sometimes pushed for unnecessary armed escorts.37 Mirroring and intensifying official restrictions on relief over several decades, cross-border relief from Chad and South Sudan has been severely restricted, with only one of 11 crossings generally open (and then Adre in Chad partially reopened in August 2024). South Sudan is potentially hugely important for deliveries to Kordofan as well as Darfur and other parts of Sudan.
Meanwhile, the RSF has been attempting to starve out the government garrisons after finding them difficult to dislodge. The RSF has also been boosting its own strength and rewarding its own followers through ransacking the countryside and many urban areas. At Kebkaibya in Darfur, the RSF has blocked relief trucks headed for the Zamzam camp.
Many observers fear widespread massacres if the RSF is able to overrun El Fasher.24 Ethnic Zaghawa make up much of the forces fighting the RSF and face retaliation if the RSF takes El Fasher.24 UN staff have been pushing for evacuation corridors from El Fasher and surrounding camps for internally displaced people.24
De Waal has noted that both sides are using starvation. He describes the RSF as ‘a looting machine, a primitive accumulation machine’.33 In effect, the RSF is issuing licenses to go and loot – a variation of the old militia strategy. De Waal also suggests that generals in the SAF are to some extent adapting to that method, resorting to militia-based warfare and using tactics of encirclement and siege against the RSF.
In Darfur, the RSF and SAF have both shelled highly populated areas, severely affecting civilians and creating widespread destruction of crucial civilian infrastructure, including water supplies, sanitation, healthcare and education.19 A June 2024 International Crisis Group report on the unfolding catastrophe in El Fasher noted:
While both the army and the RSF have egregiously violated international humanitarian law, the Sudanese who are starving are concentrated in RSF-held territory and the army-led government has refused for months to allow aid shipments to pass directly into these areas. In February [2024], General Abdelfattah al-Burhan’s government – operating from Port Sudan after being forced to relocate from Khartoum – rescinded permission for the UN to deliver assistance from Chad into RSF-held territory. After further negotiation, Burhan’s administration offered an aid corridor via a lone frontier crossing at El Tina, which is still under its control, but senior humanitarian officials say this route may prove unviable for a large-scale relief effort. It is subject to constant renegotiation, and it could soon be closed by seasonal rains.24
Fertile areas have attracted violence and hunger
As in several other famines, fertile areas have attracted violence and hunger.9,38 After war broke out in April 2023, the RSF’s quick military gains in Darfur prompted the mass expulsion of Masalit people from El Geneina in West Darfur, a relatively fertile area subject to overcrowding as pastures have deteriorated and pastoral routes shifted.14,24 The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) noted ‘the razing of all 86 gathering sites for IDPs [internally displaced people] in El Geneina town in the first month of the conflict’.39 The UN Panel of Experts noted in January 2024 that ‘in El Geneina alone, between 10,000 and 15,000 people were killed’.19 In Kordofan, both the army and the RSF have exploited ethnic tensions (as between Messiriya and Hamar) while also exploiting tensions within ethnic groups.40
In December 2023, the RSF moved into Gezira state, gaining control of one of the world’s biggest irrigation schemes. Since Gezira produces around half of Sudan’s wheat and houses most of the grain reserves, the attack has disastrous implications for the food security of the whole country. Demand for food in Gezira had already been boosted when Gezira accepted hundreds of thousands of people fleeing fighting elsewhere. Significantly, the RSF’s practice of forcibly recruiting people has been taking them away from working on food production. The RSF also looted 2,500 metric tonnes of food from a World Food Programme warehouse in Wad Madani.41
Famine tends to involve various kinds of violence and ‘pressing down’ against the victims. Resources are extracted from victims as prices change, and assets are transferred from famine victims to famine beneficiaries. Due in part to the beneficiaries’ influence on relief operations, relief frequently does not arrive until after these ‘benefits’ have been reaped.34 Creating famine through violence also tends to create ‘desperation’ prices (typically high for grain, low for livestock and labour) that have important beneficiaries. Particularly in wartime, ‘market forces’ may give way to ‘forced markets’ (as when a gun was pointed directly into Abyei marketplace in the 1986-88 famine).42
Mass livestock exports from Sudan
Janjaweed raids accelerated an expansion of livestock exports that was already notable in the 1990s. Rising livestock exports to the Middle East have created long-term pressure on subsistence farming and have fed into land conflicts.14,43
In relation to Sudan today, de Waal has referred to ‘a mass asset transfer’ centred on livestock.33 Most ships departing Port Sudan are reportedly carrying livestock headed for Saudi Arabia, and Sudan’s finance ministry reports that 2023 saw the export of 4.7 million head of livestock compared to less than 2 million in 2022.14 A recent paper notes that ‘livestock continuously flowed from areas under RSF control towards army-controlled areas to be exported through seaports, reaching 5 million heads as the highest rate of livestock export in Sudan’s history’.44 This also suggests a significant degree of RSF/SAF collusion around livestock exports, with both pursuing a version of what de Waal calls ‘colonial-capitalism’. ‘Protection’ has also been profitable for warring parties: UNHCR noted in October 2023 that ‘the practice of imposing “fees”, “fines” or “taxes” on those attempting to flee has been replicated to those unable to flee, on the pretext of guaranteeing their security’.39
Licensed violence of a wide range of actors with diverse aims
Just as the central government in Khartoum licensed the violence of militias over many decades, both sides in the war now license the violence of a wide range of actors with diverse aims.19,24,28,45,46 The strength of chains of command is uncertain and variable. The International Crisis Group notes ‘both main belligerents are struggling with command and control. Al-Burhan has grown increasingly reliant on former al-Bashir and Islamist elements, as well as communal militias and other armed groups, to battle the RSF’.26
Aid workers say the RSF is paying fighters with a license to loot and rape, and then denying responsibility. In January 2024, the UN Panel of Experts noted ‘indiscriminate attacks on civilians [and] mistreatment of civilians (torture, rape, killing, mass arrests and detentions)’, adding that these are war crimes and may amount to crimes against humanity.19,39,47,48 Licensing violence and denying responsibility has a long history in Sudan, but when powerful international actors like the USA pushed consistently to rein in militia violence as part of the North-South peace process, it did prove possible, as John Ryle noted, to ‘call off the dogs of war’.49
Responses to the humanitarian crisis
International pressure for access, peace and respecting international law was described as ‘woefully inadequate’ in an important report from Humanitarian Outcomes (December 2023).50 The report also noted: ‘In previous large humanitarian crises, humanitarian aid has often served as a substitute for political action. In Sudan, it is not even doing that.’50
It is not difficult to think of crises where humanitarian aid has indeed served as a substitute for adequate political and diplomatic intervention – earlier crises in Darfur7 and Bahr el Ghazal,9 for example, as well as disasters in Ethiopia, Rwanda, Uganda, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and former Yugoslavia.38,51–53 That danger remains in relation to the current Sudan famine.
But the Humanitarian Outcomes report is correct in highlighting the small scale of current humanitarian aid in Sudan, both in relation to needs and in comparison to past operations.50 Notably, the Darfur catastrophe of the early 2000s saw over 560,000 metric tonnes of food distributed between April 2004 and December 2005 alone. It takes relief on this magnitude to reduce food insecurity and malnutrition across a wide population. Yet today Darfur – and Sudan as a whole – has received nothing remotely on that scale (see Box 2).
Box 2. World Food Programme food aid deliveries to Darfur: 2023 and 2024
Between July and December 2023, the World Food Programme (WFP) was unable to deliver any assistance to North, South or East Darfur (while providing 11 convoys of food for West and Central Darfur).
From January to August 2024, there was a total of 15 convoys (four from Port Sudan and the rest from Chad). Adding up the tonnages of food delivered by WFP to Darfur (or en route) gives a total of 19,732 metric tonnes. Since WFP calculates that 1,000 metric tonnes will feed around 83,000 people for a month, 19,732 tonnes would feed around 1.64 million people for just one month. Yet the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) put the population in need in just North Darfur at over 2.6 million people back in 2023.54 |
Source: Author’s own. Sourced cited.
Alarmingly, in comparison to other recent access-restrained emergencies in Yemen, Haiti, Myanmar and Central African Republic, Sudan has both the greatest percentage of people in need and the lowest proportion of people reached.50 In June 2024, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) said relief supplies had reached 35% of people identified as needing help (and only 30% of internally displaced people).55 The Humanitarian Outcome’s national survey found that food aid had reached only 16% of those who needed it.
A range of cash transfers – both by international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and by diaspora, friends and relatives – have circumvented obstacles to the delivery of physical aid, helping the local emergency response rooms (community-led aid groups), for example. But cash-without-food is inflationary and not everyone has access to cash transfers. Cash transfers also face their own difficulties, including with telecommunications.
Alan Boswell, an expert at the International Crisis Group, said in May 2024:
You can’t help but watch the level of focus on crises like Gaza and Ukraine and wonder what just 5% of that energy could have done in a context like Sudan and how many thousands, tens of thousands of lives it could’ve saved.56
Inadequacy of protection for civilians
UN peacekeeping and fact-finding missions
The African Union-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID), a peacekeeping mission established belatedly in 2007, was terminated in December 2020 amidst pressure from the USA to cut the peacekeeping budget. This was despite rebel groups and militias still being active in Darfur, and 1.5 million people still living in camps for internally displaced people. Sudan’s new head of state, General Burhan, said quite openly in May 2019 that the regime planned to give the remaining UN bases to the RSF.57 An article in The New Humanitarian noted in May 2021 that ‘many Darfuris believe the [UN] pullout has worsened the security situation’, particularly in El Geneina37 where violence subsequently escalated into large-scale massacres.19 Human Rights Watch noted that ‘from late April to early November 2023, the RSF and allied militias conducted a systematic campaign to remove, including by killing, ethnic Massalit residents… from El Geneina’.58
With needs for protection escalating, the independent fact-finding mission established by the UN Human Rights Council has now helpfully recommended the deployment of ‘an independent and impartial force with a mandate to safeguard civilians’.59
International pressure on the RSF and SAF
With conflict escalating in Darfur in particular, the USA has imposed sanctions on RSF commanders and has threatened more. The USA has also exerted some degree of pressure on the United Arab Emirates to rein in the RSF,24,26 in a context where the UN Panel of Experts found ‘credible’ evidence of weapons supplies from the United Arab Emirates to the RSF.19 But while the RSF assault on El Fasher might have been stalled,24 any such pressure has been insufficient to ease the crisis.
There is also an urgent need for escalated international pressure on Saudi Arabia and Egypt in relation to their support for the SAF.24
Russia also has influence: the RSF leader Hemedti established close ties with Russia and met Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov on the day Russia invaded Ukraine.27
Need for concerted diplomatic pressure
Progress on peace and access has been complicated by a proliferation of peace initiatives and a lack of cooperation between them.19 But concerted diplomatic pressure can sharply rein in a human-made famine, as occurred with Operation Lifeline Sudan in 1989 after earlier diplomatic silences had helped raiding and withholding relief to proceed virtually unchecked.9 Buy-in from the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Russia will be important. Given that there are elements of collusion with warring parties and the associated war economy, any such buy-in requires Western governments to prioritise humanitarian over other considerations in their diplomatic relations with such countries.
Protection for refugees
Protection also involves a willingness of neighbouring states to receive refugees. Yet Amnesty International reports that Egypt has been arresting and forcibly returning Sudanese refugees fleeing the war.60 Concerned governments should be engaging neighbouring countries to respect international law and provide support for those who flee, a task made easier when willingness to receive refugees is shared by governments exerting ‘pressure’.
Inadequacy of relief
There has been a major mismatch between the geography of needs and the geography of response. The Humanitarian Outcomes report (December 2023) noted that ‘the aid response remains primarily focused in the more accessible east of the country and SAF-controlled areas, and most agencies are still struggling to operate in much of the country, where needs are highest, and RSF-controlled areas’.50 See Box 3 for examples of reasons for the geographical mismatch of needs and delivery (in whatever part of the world).
Box 3. Examples of reasons for geographical mismatch of needs and delivery
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Source: Author’s own.
Even in areas where aid is concentrated and access and security are relatively good, aid staff report an aid agency presence that is insufficient to meet the needs of internally displaced people – as in Kassala, Gedaref and Port Sudan. The same can be said of needs in neighbouring countries despite being less ‘hard to reach’.
Diplomatic pressures are normally needed to counter mismatches between needs and distributions. In many other disasters, accessible areas have received considerably more relief, while areas of intensive need have been neglected.8,61,62 Neglect of relatively hard-to-reach rural areas tends to encourage migration to urban areas and may contribute to high mortality from diseases in camps.61 An inter-agency evaluation of responses to crisis in Northern Ethiopia in 2024 noted that ‘humanitarian aid was blocked, resulting in a situation when, at times, only 10 per cent of aid needed for the Tigrayan population reached the region’.63
Pushing against the obstacles or ‘constraints’ to humanitarian relief
In the aid world, good intentions often fall foul of political obstacles. But in an important contribution, Bernard Schaffer suggested that ‘constraints’ can sometimes be addressed, particularly when ‘obstacles to implementation’ are incorporated into the design of policy.64
The following sections explore opportunities for pushing against ‘constraints’.
Funding
Funding constraints are easiest to tackle. OCHA reported that the 2024 Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan for Sudan had been only 15% funded, a shockingly low figure.55 Funding constraints have even led to ration cuts in Chad where security is relatively good.65
Blocking relief
When relief is blocked by warring parties, cross-border relief can be especially helpful (as in Ethiopia in the 1980s). Neglect of cross-border relief has also been noted by critics.66 Such operations may have varying degrees of government support or no such support.
The Humanitarian Outcome’s report (December 2023) noted: ‘there is a need to move away from a response that is centred on Port Sudan and a government-dominated architecture of control over aid. Efforts should be intensified to open up more crossing points for aid in both government and RSF-controlled areas from Ethiopia, South Sudan and Chad.’50 Deference to host governments in development programmes is not appropriate when governments are stoking a humanitarian crisis. Many aid workers see UN and diplomatic pressure as insufficient, particularly pressure on the SAF. The recent resumption of relief through Adre in Chad (with reported consent from the RSF and SAF) shows what increased diplomatic attention can do, even as relief deliveries remain drastically short of needs. Negotiators felt some within the army were sympathetic to relief, while hardline elements linked to the earlier al Bashir regime were not.49
Security
An important lesson from other crises is that security conditions tend to vary widely between different areas. The Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Yemen crisis was critical of blanket decisions on security, saying these had unnecessarily restricted assistance to relatively secure parts of the country.68
The Humanitarian Outcome’s report on Sudan noted that with the resumption of war in April 2023, the ‘decision to evacuate [international staff], however justified – and indeed required by many organisations’ policies – had a major impact on the capacity to maintain aid programmes and to quickly respond to new needs’.50 Even as needs surged, the aid presence ‘reduced a lot’.50 The Humanitarian Outcome’s nationwide survey suggested many areas of Sudan remained accessible for relief but still received little.50
A perceived lack of capacity to deliver assistance then became a significant factor in low levels of funding from donors.50 One aid worker said: ‘The UN system requests more money from donors and often they get the answer that the money already allocated has not been spent. There’s an impasse.’
Médecins Sans Frontières has been active in all the Darfurs and has delivered some aid, while some commercial supplies have also been delivered in the face of security obstacles.1,69 But much of the relief has been what one aid worker called ‘hit and run’ operations from Chad to El Geneina, just inside Sudan. Noting that the security risks are real, Alessandro Mangione of Médecins Sans Frontières suggested: ‘Most of the organisations are quite risk averse. There’s a lot of fear and little rationalising of what the risks are… A lot is coming from self-imposed limitations. There’s an incapacity to take a strong stance towards scaling up, with a rational risk analysis, knowing that this crisis needs responses with a large risk appetite.’
Security obstacles require creative solutions (none of which will be devoid of risk) and strong diplomatic pressure, while a lack of physical presence feeds into difficulties in assessing risk. The much talked-about ‘triple nexus’ – the idea that development, humanitarian work and peace should be addressed together – can potentially inhibit quick humanitarian responses if progress on peace and development is treated as a necessary condition for humanitarian relief.
Advocacy
Aid agencies tend to balance ‘access’ and ‘advocacy’. Speaking out on human rights abuses can certainly bring retaliation, including violence and expulsion. But one lesson from other crises is that speaking out strongly can also improve access, as was the case when international condemnation of human-made famine in Sudan belatedly led to markedly improved access for relief to the south from 1989. Conversely, humanitarian space may actually shrink over time when aid organisations keep very quiet in the hope of winning the favour of governments or other warring parties.70,71
The causes of famine and displacement may be rather systematically distorted when aid organisations’ data downplay conflict and play up beneficiaries’ personal responsibility and ‘resilience’ (including a focus on hygiene and nutritional habits).7,72 An evaluation of responses to the early 2000s crisis in Darfur noted that ‘more, not less, public advocacy on behalf of war-affected women, men and children would have helped to create a more protective environment’.73 It also noted the need for a ‘common and clearly articulated advocacy strategy for Darfur earlier in the crisis’.73
The Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation of the Yemen crisis noted the need for a coordinated approach to pushing for conflict resolution, for access and for ‘red lines’ with aid delivery.68 The need for coordinated advocacy was also one of the conclusions in a World Food Programme evaluation of aid to Sri Lanka in 2008 to 2009.71 A key criticism in the Inter-Agency Humanitarian Evaluation on Ethiopia was that there were ‘few, if any, collective statements against the blockade imposed against Tigray, the harassment, arbitrary arrests and detentions or torture of UN and non-UN humanitarian staff or the practice of starvation as a weapon of war’.63 Such lessons have now been repeatedly noted but much less often learned.
On 28 August 2024, Reuters reported that the ‘WFP [World Food Programme] and other U.N. agencies have complained that lack of access contributed to their inability to reach people in need, mostly in areas under RSF control such as Khartoum and the Darfur and Kordofan regions. But the aid agencies have largely avoided blaming either of the warring parties publicly’.74 This would seem to be another case of lessons not learned. In Sudan, according to Humanitarian Outcome’s report, ‘some practitioners noted a tendency to “shut up and put up, and see what you can negotiate quietly on your own”’.50 Often granting short-term access for relatively small amounts of aid, abusive governments have themselves been learning a great deal, including about how to encourage a quiet and deferential approach within the UN and the aid system more generally: they use their ability to ‘turn the aid tap on and off’ as a way to shape the narrative.
With current diplomatic negotiations focusing heavily on humanitarian access (and impeded by disputes over ‘sovereignty’), there is a danger that more fundamental negotiations over securing peace will be sidelined – or simply blocked by the evident problems with achieving even that ‘access’ agenda. In Sudan now, a focus on bureaucratic constraints risks obscuring breaches of international humanitarian and human rights law, including the use of aid denial as a weapon of war.50 One aid worker said donors do not take risks if the needs are not clearly documented and they feel they cannot meet their key performance indicators.
Full and accurate information about the amount of aid delivered in relation to needs
Commenting on the current famine in Sudan, a report from Humanitarian Outcomes (December 2023) noted:
Interviewees confirmed that the amounts of aid actually reaching people are still very low and noted a reluctance on the part of the international aid system to openly acknowledge the limits to reach. Statements tended to focus instead on metrics like truckloads and tonnages delivered, without details on how many people were being reached, with how much aid, and how regularly.50
This is important. OCHA’s updates present figures on the ‘numbers reached’ but give little sense of how much food was distributed to recipients or how this long food this lasted.75 Even the numbers of people in need in particular locations are often unclear in OCHA updates. We also do not hear about the numbers in need who are not being targeted with humanitarian relief.76 Again, an important danger here is that the wider public may get the impression that a crisis is being significantly addressed when it is not.
Again, lessons have not been sufficiently learned from other crises. In 2017, a Saferworld report on the civil war in Syria noted that OCHA reports gave little sense of how long people would be sustained on relief delivered. The report added, ‘yet such an exercise would seem to be fundamental to assessing the adequacy of delivery’.75 During the 1986 to 1988 famine in Sudan, needs assessments routinely gave estimates of the populations that were ‘in need and reachable’, but this was radically different from assessing the actual level of needs; together with a late recognition of famine, it lent an aura of success to interventions that were actually failing people badly.9,35,77 In Sri Lanka, human rights abuses and aid shortages in 2008 to 2009 were encouraged when needs were minimised; information issued by the aid system was largely deferential to government priorities, and this made it harder to lobby for prioritising humanitarian agendas – not least in relation to the competing ministries of donor governments.71
Famine declarations
The bar for declaring – and responding to – emergencies in the Global South has in practice been rising since the 1970s. Even at IPC level 4 (the level below famine), there may be large-scale mortality, as during famines in South Sudan in 2017 and Yemen from 2018. Particularly since risks of large-scale mortality have been under-recognised, a clear declaration of famine (IPC level 5) can make a big difference in overcoming official obstacles and bureaucratic restrictions. The declaration also changes incentives. Peter Cutler’s study of international responses to famine in Ethiopia in the 1980s showed how quickly bureaucratic incentives may change, notably among the major donors and in the upper echelons of the UN system.78 Public revelations of famine may mean it becomes risky not to take bold action for humanitarian relief, whereas before it had been risky to take such actions. An early recognition of famine also counteracts predictable delays in relief delivery.79
One major problem in Sudan today is that officially the SAF – as the UN-recognised government – has had a veto on IPC famine declarations. De Waal noted: ‘So in effect it’s taking one of the men who made the famine and saying “You decide if this is a famine or not!”’33
When it comes to famine declarations, parties creating famines seem to be learning lessons faster than the international community. Part of the problem, Ben Parker has noted, is that ‘nobody wants to look bad because a famine is declared on their watch’. That may include aid agencies as well as governments in famine-affected countries.80 In relation to the current famine in Sudan, an aid worker said, ‘one problem is that a famine declaration is a recognition of failure in terms of what people have been able to do and the fact that the Famine Prevention Plan has not succeeded’.80
Scarcity and relief patterns as a source of insecurity
Famine – particularly when left largely unaddressed – will tend to promote violence as more and more groups are tempted and encouraged to ‘solve’ their problems through depriving others. Scarcity can also be manipulated for recruiting fighters. One report noted that in Gezira state the RSF ‘has sought to use food as a weapon, withholding supplies from the hungry in a bid to coerce men and boys to join its ranks’.41 More generally, a study covering Sudan between 2001 and 2012 found that rising food prices were an important cause of conflict events.81 Even before the war, the RSF was gaining strength from crisis situations, including food insecurity. Both the RSF and the SAF are distributing aid (and advertising this on social media), and the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia are also delivering relief.82 The greater the scarcity, the more opportunities there are for warring parties to expand their influence. That said, with escalating starvation the RSF will likely grow and splinter. When warlords proliferate, it makes peace agreements harder, as seen in Darfur in the early 2000s.
Aid deliveries may feed into war when they fall into the hands of armed groups or when they incentivise the mass movement of people to areas where relief is available.9,83 Such risks have been highlighted in the ‘do no harm’ approach, along with alleged risks of ‘creating dependency’.7,72,84–86 But lack of aid may also strongly fuel war, and aid is only one resource among many that can fund fighters.51,52,75 In fact, a concern with the possible negative effects of humanitarian aid – developed principally in relation to crises in Ethiopia, Sudan and the Rwanda/Democratic Republic of Congo borderlands – has often been taken up in ways that end up perpetuating the habitual discrimination against rebel-held areas that was, ironically, a key concern arising from earlier humanitarian aid responses.87 Again, resulting shortages can encourage people to become involved in armed groups as a way to survive.51,75
Cash
The Sudan INGO Forum, which coordinates and represents INGOs in Sudan, noted in July 2024: ‘cash is currently the quickest – and sometimes the only – way to save lives in conflict-affected areas of Sudan. INGOs have the operational capacity to reach nearly 2 million people with life-saving cash assistance in the next three months – however despite advocacy efforts, cash-based approaches are still not prioritised in the response.’47
Cash can overcome some of the security obstacles impeding food aid, and it can help people to hold onto assets, pursue or avoid migration, access medical care and generally set their own priorities.12 It also helps to sustain markets. In Sudan today, cash relief has been impeded by fuel shortages and damage to banking and telecommunications infrastructure.39 Another complicating factor is the influence of the RSF and SAF in telecommunications and banking.88 Significant distributions have been possible, including through the traditional hawala system for informal remittances outside the banking system. Experts have called for banks to partner with fintech companies, for credit vouchers through telecommunications companies and for support for hawala.88
Food deliveries are also essential if cash is not to fuel inflation. As Amartya Sen and Jean Drèze acknowledged, cash distributions can be inflationary where local food supplies are scarce.89 Noting the emphasis on cash distributions in the 2024 Famine Prevention Plan, one aid worker said: ‘Cash to buy what? Considering that the markets were empty, I don’t know how it can work. It took away the responsibility of the international community to push for a supply chain to respond to the needs.’ Across Sudan, millet and sorghum prices rose on average by 100% to 150% from July 2022 to July 2023, and faster in Darfur.90 Average national sorghum prices rose 124% in the year to June 2024.91
Injecting large amounts of food into a particular area reduces food prices and helps even those people who do not receive food aid. Insofar as violence is driven by need, bringing down prices helps security.38 For those who do not benefit from a programme of cash relief, the inflationary effects mean they may be worse off than before, something that needs to be counteracted by food deliveries.
In any event, Sudan clearly needs what de Waal has called a ‘belt and braces’ approach – cash, food, diplomatic pressure, everything.33
Supporting local organisations and providers
Another opportunity for pushing back against relief ‘constraints’ is supporting local organisations more strongly. In conflict areas, local civil society organisations and NGOs – like the emergency response rooms that grew out of neighbourhood-based resistance committees – are often best placed to help,39,92,93 particularly given that most international staff have been evacuated. These organisations have been ‘critical frontline responders’.93
The 2016 ‘Grand Bargain’ included an international commitment to channel 25% of humanitarian funding to local and national actors ‘as directly as possible’.94 But localisation can also be a cover for international withdrawal, and, if localisation is not adequately supported, this redoubles the damage.95 Some see Sudan as a ‘test case’ for the commitment to localisation.92 Yet in practice progress has been limited.94 In Sudan, despite some small grants from OCHA, local aid providers have not been systematically tracked or funded.50 Some community-based protection networks have received UNHCR funding.39 But Humanitarian Outcomes reported in December 2023 that ‘out of US $2 million pledged by international actors for emergency response rooms in Greater Khartoum, less than US $200,000 had materialised by late September’.50 Even USD two million is a tiny fraction of overall humanitarian needs. Moreover, only 4% of aid allocations was going to national NGOs,50 leaving emergency response rooms to depend largely on local and diaspora funding.92 In July 2024, the Sudan INGO Forum called for an increase of funding for local responders, noting the need for ‘flexible and predictable funding through the removal of burdensome compliance processes’.47
One aid worker said: ‘Local service providers need support. USAID [U.S. Agency for International Development] and ECHO [European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations] orally consider finding money for local organisations. In practice, it has never really materialised, which is quite bizarre.’ The aid worker added that it is a contrast to some other crises where a lot of money has been channelled to local organisations.
The difficulties with supporting civil society should not be underestimated. One complicating factor is that civil society organisations are under pressure from warring parties, not least because of their connections to resistance committees. Connections may also reflect long-standing state efforts to co-opt civil society.50 UNHCR noted in October 2023, ‘while local actors are often extremely well positioned to understand needs and identify solutions to logistical barriers, they are also inevitably more intertwined with and affected by local and regional political and conflict dynamics’.39
Drawing a distinct line between the state and civil society is difficult, particularly where undemocratic government has prevailed for decades. But Sudan’s history of dictatorial government – and civil society resistance to it – also underlines the importance of supporting civil society, not least in preserving the ability of civil society to stand up to state oppression. This ability took many decades to develop and was crucial in overthrowing the al Bashir regime.
More immediately, local NGOs also need funding to recover from the looting of offices and equipment.50 Noting the widespread looting and intimidation to which local organisations have been subjected, as well as their frequent inability to pay salaries and the occurrence of large-scale redundancies, Mark Bradbury and colleagues with long experience of humanitarian work in Sudan noted that ‘large parts of Sudan’s extensive civil society infrastructure could simply disappear under current pressures if they are not supported now, when they are most needed, to continue and amplify their role as frontline humanitarian responders’.93 Aid staff stressed that since local organisations face a greater risk of violent retaliation, international presence is also important for solidarity, protection and promoting a larger humanitarian space.
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Authors: This brief was written by David Keen (Professor of Conflict Studies, Department of International Development, London School of Economics and Political Science).
Acknowledgements: The brief was reviewed by Melissa Parker (LSHTM), Susanne Jaspars (SOAS), Alex de Waal (World Peace Foundation), Mark Duffield (University of Bristol), Alessandro Mangione (MSF), Mark Bradbury (Rift Valley Institute), Fabrice Weissman (MSF), Leben Moro (University of Juba). Coordination was provided by Juliet Bedford (Anthrologica) and the brief was edited by Harriet MacLehose. Any errors are the author’s own. The brief is the responsibility of SSHAP.
Suggested citation: Keen, D. (2024). Key considerations: Humanitarian responses to famine and war in Sudan. Social Science in Humanitarian Action Platform (SSHAP). www.doi.org/10.19088/SSHAP.2024.055
Published by the Institute of Development Studies: October 2024.
Copyright: © Institute of Development Studies 2024. This is an Open Access paper distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence (CC BY 4.0). Except where otherwise stated, this permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source are credited and any modifications or adaptations are indicated.
Contact: If you have a direct request concerning the brief, tools, additional technical expertise or remote analysis, or should you like to be considered for the network of advisers, please contact the Social Science in Humanitarian Action Platform by emailing Annie Lowden ([email protected]) or Juliet Bedford ([email protected]).
About SSHAP: The Social Science in Humanitarian Action (SSHAP) is a partnership between the Institute of Development Studies, Anthrologica , CRCF Senegal, Gulu University, Le Groupe d’Etudes sur les Conflits et la Sécurité Humaine (GEC-SH), the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, the Sierra Leone Urban Research Centre, University of Ibadan, and the University of Juba. This work was supported by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and Wellcome 225449/Z/22/Z. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the funders, or the views or policies of the project partners.
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