Mutual aid lessons and experiences from Emergency Response Rooms in Sudan

The civil war in the Republic of Sudan, which began in April 2023, has fuelled and exacerbated an already severe humanitarian crisis. As of September 2024, over 25 million people – half the country’s population – need assistance. In response, grassroots movements have emerged, drawing on past experiences of collective mobilisation. Volunteer networks, known as Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), in which the ‘room’ refers to the online group chats where they were originally conceived and planned, are one example.

This Key Considerations brief is based on the first case study of ERRs,¹ which was conducted between June and August 2024. Building on interviews with volunteers, the case study highlights the perspectives of ERR volunteers and details the emergence, growth, workflows and partnerships of ERRs. The brief further draws on published research exploring the complexities of the humanitarian response in Sudan and the concept of mutual aid, including ERRs.

The aim of the brief is to describe key considerations for understanding ERRs and how they might be supported. The brief also explores the implications of meaningful and locally impactful partnerships with national and international humanitarian and development actors (IHDAs), even amidst complex humanitarian dynamics and acute conflict. The brief has been written for all actors following or engaged in the Sudan response – local, national and international.

Key considerations

Understanding ERRs and local actors

• Recognise the ethos underpinning ERRs. There are many mechanisms of social solidarity that have a long history in Sudan, including ‘nafeer’ –نفير. Before engaging in partnership with local actors, IHDAs should ensure they understand these underpinnings and how they inform local actors’ responses.
• Acknowledge differences between ERRs which reflect the diversity of needs across the country. Needs, expertise and contextual variations guide the work done by ERRs. It is important not to generalise the working modalities and motivations from one ERR to another, but rather to understand the unique experiences and roles of each ERR.
• Acknowledge the wider network of solidarity actors that have come together to support locally led responses by Sudanese people for themselves. This includes informal networks, diaspora groups and national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who raise awareness and funding or engage in collaborative service delivery. These groups should not be arranged hierarchically but rather recognised for their unique responses and how they might operate synergistically.

Supporting ERRs and local actors in the short to medium term

• IHDAs, ERRs and other solidarity actors could mount a collaborative and scaled response in Sudan, but there will need to be a change to current approaches. The larger international humanitarian and development system appears to be interested in engagement with ERRs but is ill-suited for it. So far, engagement has been structured in a way that places unequal workload and risk on ERR volunteers and consequently slows or prevents the delivery of aid. To reach inaccessible areas of the country, collaborative work is needed.
• Foster equitable partnerships recognising the current levels of trust and capacity to respond (during the conflict and well beyond) for both the locally led and international aid responses. For IHDAs, such as UN agencies, international NGOs and donor organisations, this means moving beyond transactional relationships. Instead, IHDAs should foster partnerships grounded in mutual respect, shared values and a commitment to having local actors lead. IHDAs’ detailed examination of local organisations’ processes and approaches does not promote an environment of two-way trust and stifles robust partnerships, which in turn can affect a timely and scaled response.
• Understand the immense physical and psychological risk ERR volunteers face. Recognising these volunteers as aid workers, advocating for their safety and providing them with support similar to that provided to people working for international aid actors is paramount to show them respect as well as enable their continued response.
• Learn from and support locally designed mechanisms of governance and coordination to streamline and improve meaningful collaboration with local actors. For example, engage with ERRs through their systems as this not only enables leadership growth, but it also ensures the relevance and sustainability of any provided support mechanisms.

Broader, long-term benefits of supporting ERRs and local actors

• If ERRs and IHDAs overcome the challenges of working together, this could enable a new era of localisation in Sudan. Building sustainably minded, context-tailored and ethical partnerships between ERRs and IHDAs is an opportunity to set precedence for how mutual aid in Sudan, and elsewhere, can be meaningfully supported.
• Push for a holistic response to the war and the growing humanitarian needs. The work of grassroots groups needs to be appreciated and supported, yet the importance of robust assistance in a country facing famine cannot go unheeded. Learning from previous responses should be emphasised.
• Ongoing documentation, analysis and learning from grassroots responses like the ERRs is essential. Learning from this response and its variation by context builds an evidence base for future localised responses in war-affected settings.

Humanitarian action in an ongoing war

The current war in Sudan was ignited by a power struggle between two armies – the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and a paramilitary group known as the Rapid Support Forces (RSF). This ongoing struggle for power sustains the conflict at the expense of civilian lives.

Before the war, Sudan already struggled with a high burden of disease,² food insecurity³ and a neglected displacement crisis.⁴ These struggles have been amplified by the conflict and with catastrophic effects. The health system has been weakened and many facilities have shut down.² High levels of food insecurity are faced by half the country,⁵ and current data suggest that more than 10.3 million people – every fifth person – has been displaced.⁶ Edem Wosornu, the Operations and Advocacy Division Director at the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), referred to Sudan as ‘one of the worst humanitarian disasters in recent memory’.⁷

Media coverage, political will and funding all remain low.⁴ In April 2024, donors came together in Paris in an effort to raise the USD 2.7 billion of funds that the UN estimated is required to address the unfolding crisis.⁸ While pledges were made, a current estimation of the assembled funding suggests it is just 41% of what is needed.⁶

A restricted humanitarian space for international actors

Funding is not the only challenge for international actors to provide a timely and scaled response: Sudan is a complex environment in which to operate, with insecurity and limited humanitarian access constraining possibilities for assistance.^9,10 This is not a new situation in Sudan,¹¹ and similar challenges have been reported elsewhere, including Myanmar, Ethiopia and Syria.¹² In these contexts, with military regimes using aid access as a bargaining chip, IHDAs face ethical dilemmas; for example, should they continue working through the ‘state’ while ignoring political complexities and human rights violations?¹³

Grassroots humanitarian action, including ERRs

Civil society and volunteer networks in Sudan began responding to humanitarian needs despite having limited formal systems.^14,15 In action akin to ‘mutual aid’, local solidarity groups have coalesced and enacted timely and innovative responses that are widespread across the country. Volunteer networks operating under the name ‘Emergency Response Rooms’ (ERRs) are one such group.

The ERRs’ direct humanitarian access in localities and their adaptable approaches have proven to be an asset in the tough environment.¹⁶ ERRs have garnered increasing attention, with some IHDAs learning from them and using their actions to challenge their own organisation’s protocols, while other IHDAs seek partnerships with ERRs. Despite the attention, engagement between ERRs and IHDAs remains tenuous. IHDAs have been criticised for being slow to adapt and thus slow to enter genuine partnerships with locally led groups, including ERRs.¹⁷

Box 1 provides context for terminology used in the brief around mutual aid, solidarity, humanitarian resistance and IHDAs.

Box 1. A note on terminology

A variety of disciplines have used different concepts to analyse and describe how local groups coalesce in times of crisis. In recent years, emphasis has been given to ‘mutual aid’ and ‘local actors’. However, communitas, self-help, citizen- or community-led response, neighbour help and local agency are also relevant. In this brief, mutual aid refers to the work of diverse groups coming together at times of collective crisis to reciprocally provide for one another. Mutual aid can take many forms, including financial aid, food and other in-kind support.18 A related term is solidarity, which captures the idea of individuals having shared feelings, opinions or aims.19 Solidarity in humanitarianism has been used to describe the departure from the principle of neutrality, to one that sees actors ‘take a side’.20 In the literature concerning mutual aid, solidarity typically denotes both an ethical foundation and an action approach that are united for a cause.21 Thus solidarity-led mutual aid can be akin to Slim’s description of ‘humanitarian resistance’ – where the ‘side’ chosen is that of those suffering under an unjust enemy regime and where action is taken for the rescue, relief or protection of those suffering.22 International humanitarian and development actor (IHDA) is an additional term used in this brief to encompass UN agencies, international non-governmental organisations and donor organisations.

Source: Author’s own. Sources cited.

Case study: Experiences from ERRs in Sudan

Since the outbreak of war in April 2023, locally led initiatives have been leading the humanitarian response – but through a variety of organisations and modalities. The ERRs are one such organisation. There are an estimated 360 ERRs active in seven states nationwide. The day-to-day activities of ERRs are diverse, reflecting the range of people involved and their ability to respond to hyperlocalised needs.

This section draws on 12 interviews to detail the emergence and workings of ERRs, the reflections of those who work in them and the complexities of joint working between IHDAs and ERRs. Pseudonyms are used throughout to protect the identities of the interviewees.

Emergence of ERRs

ERRs have gained international attention for their work since April 2023, yet their rise predates this.

Sudan’s history played a significant role in the emergence of ERRs. Economic stagnation, fuelled by war, sanctions and political oppression, forced various interest groups to unite and call for change. Resistance Committees – neighbourhood-based collectives advocating for democracy – are one such group that emerged during the 2019 popular civilian uprising.²³

Outside of political work, Resistance Committees formed service committees dedicated to public services underfunded by the federal system.^23,24 The service committee in Arkaweet (أركويت), a neighbourhood in the east of central Khartoum, formed one of the first ERRs during the COVID-19 wave in March 2020.²⁵ The plan for this ERR started with a message exchange between two friends who were members of the service committee: ‘He just texted me…he asked me, “Naila, what about we make an emergency room? What do you think?” And I said, “It’s a good idea. Let’s do it.”‘ The service committee gathered volunteers and started to respond locally to medical needs, while spreading awareness about the evolving public health crisis. The name ‘Emergency Response Room’ soon surfaced to denote the volunteers’ primary goal of providing emergency medical services and the WhatsApp chat ‘rooms’ the groups were formulated in.

On 15 April 2023, the first bombs were dropped close to Naila’s neighbourhood,²⁶ and Naila said: ‘[…] immediately after the war [started], we just reactivated our emergency room…We already had the network. We already had the volunteers, and we were ready…we said: “Let’s start”‘.

This decision to stay and act was the first of many in what became an evolving ERR movement, with the war bringing new meaning to the name ‘Emergency Response Room’.

Underpinning ethos: Nafeer and a commitment to home

ERR volunteer accounts from different areas often begin, ‘It started in my neighbourhood…’.

This phrasing by interviewees is not an attempt to claim ownership of the idea but rather to emphasise the shared ethos and sense of belonging to a collective home that inspired individuals to act almost simultaneously and in parallel. Nalia shared, ‘… our motivation came from our love of Sudan, our belonging to Sudan and our ownership of Sudan… a social accountability to our country’.

Hamza recounts this in sharing the beginning of Al Jerif’s (الجريف) ERR:

The ERR started the second week of the war…it was in my neighbourhood of Jerif. That was the first ERR. And then from there, ERRs started to pop up in the rest of Khartoum…it wasn’t the idea of an emergency response room or anything. It was just like a nafeer.’

Nafeer (نفير) is best described or translated as ‘a call to collective action’. While it is well known in Sudan and has spurred previous crisis responses, it has been documented just a few times in academic literature.^27–29

ERR volunteer Aziza described nafeer this way:

There is no structure, there’s nothing, it’s just a literal translation of ‘it’s calling to mobilise’. So, we will mobilise people, resources, in-kind [assistance], cash and everything. We just call people to do this, and they respond.

Hamza shared:

It’s not new at all. Sudanese people have always been known to come together when there’s a need. And, you know…Our grandparents are telling us, you don’t sleep if your neighbours are hungry. You can’t eat if your neighbours haven’t eaten…You gotta’ go and help them.

The concept of nafeer proved integral in the formation of ERRs and remains central to the continued motivation of volunteers. As ERRs were initiated by people who care about their neighbours and country, accountability within their localities has occurred organically, and it is grounded in a strong sense of mutuality.

Network unification and locally fostered trust

Beyond the underlying ethos and central motivation of nafeer, there are other enabling factors that have contributed to the development of a wider and more formalised movement of ERRs. Network unification was one such factor. Preexisting network connections from neighbourhood social welfare groups enabled volunteers, particularly young people, to react quickly to the unfolding crisis.

In interviews, individuals described coalescing their personal and professional networks, with the most prominent connection being Resistance Committees. ERR volunteer Aziza in Khartoum reflected:

There [was] trust [in] networks that preexisted before the war…people were already known to each other. Those people who are activists in the ERR now are, you know, not all of them, but many of them, [were] involved in their localities…in their neighbourhood associations…like cultural one, social, educational, anything.

Unification of various groups – transcending age, gender and ethnic divides – has further strengthened ERR responses. This includes a network of supporting actors outside Sudan who have built on long-standing traditions of remittance and Zakat (the Islamic charitable donation) and who currently play a significant role in public fundraising for ERRs.¹⁶ Interviewees highlighted how the ERRs’ continued presence – and their history of action in crises – gained them trust and legitimacy despite the war. To quote Aziza: ‘There is respect from the community for those people who are doing… you know, [doing] services for the communities…[we] are the only providers of aid on the ground.’

Such trust and legitimacy have drawn in new members. Noor, in South Darfur, reflected on how the ERRs inspired and united people in her city. While not a part of an ERR, Noor’s perspective is important – she is a neighbourhood member and an employee of an international humanitarian NGO. She said:

You are seeing your community suffering. Let’s say you don’t have money, you don’t have food, but you have your power, you have your knowledge, you can do something. So you feel the fulfilment. …Then the community, they feel like, okay, we don’t have to look for help from others. We can have help from ourselves. It really gives hope to the community. That’s the ERR, like community, you know, it’s different structures, so people at different levels, they feel like, we are connected.

While the preexisting networks initiated the ERRs, it was the ERRs’ own fostered trust and open membership policies that helped to expand them. Explaining how ERR membership differed from Resistance Committees or other preexisting groups, Naila said: ‘ERs [ERRs] – it’s a wide, wide umbrella. Anyone can join it.’

The first Khartoum State ERR report echoed Naila’s point, highlighting the diversity of volunteers making up each group.²⁴

In South Darfur, volunteer Jameela illustrated how technical specialists and other neighbourhood members similarly came together in response to the growing needs:

It started as a response to the need. Healthcare workers saw the need and started the ‘health emergency room’, pharmacists started the ‘pharmacists emergency room’… People with a lot of connections worked together to bring staff and people in… [A]fter the war did not end, the rest of the neighbourhood began to enter… joining the mother room.

Organising structures

An organising structure and vision for the ERRs gradually emerged, with experiences from the Resistance Committees providing a foundation to build upon. In a 2021 mapping of youth initiatives across Sudan, nearly 5,300 Resistance Committees were identified and were present in all states.³⁰ The breadth of the work by Resistance Committees meant there was a well-known framework for ERRs to draw on.

In a podcast interview, Hajooj Kuka, the External Communication Officer for Khartoum State, described the benefits of neighbourhood structures and processes, such as the Resistance Committees. To quote: ‘[W]hat we’ve noticed is, because of the way the Sudanese revolution was, because we were neighbourhood based, because we were already organised, because we were already connected – we are the perfect example of what mutual aid can be.’³¹

Two important components of Resistance Committees carried into the ERRs: (a) a model for participatory inclusive governance³² and (b) a framework for decentralised ‘ground up’ organisation.^23,24,33

In Khartoum State, structures to organise and coordinate ERRs had taken shape by May 2023. A parliamentary body had been formed with three nominated representatives from each of the seven districts with ERRs, inclusive gender representation and established term limits. Modelling good governance, a charter was written and voted upon for a clear mandate. The ERRs in Khartoum State published the charter as a collective group and articulated that the values of ‘transparency, equality, participation and accountability’ would direct all their work.^34,35

More structures for coordination were subsequently developed, including executive committees (e.g., for programming and finance) and specialty offices (e.g., for health, protection and women’s response rooms focused on gender-specific needs). This high-level organisation has not detracted from ERR volunteers’ local work. Specific programming decisions remain with ‘base’ ERRs operating at the neighbourhood level to ensure actions are fit for the needs and context. Describing the horizontal structure, ERR volunteer Mutasim said: ‘In the emergency room, there is no hierarchy. Everyone, whether a founder or a newcomer, has a role based on their capabilities.’

ERRs across other states simultaneously established and with this ERR coordination structures to collaborate emerged. These coordinating structures include the Localisation Coordination Council, which was formed in September 2023. This council was created to bring together ERRs and national and international NGOs for coordination and to share resources. At the time of the interviews, volunteers shared that at council meetings about 30 state-level ERR representatives gather with NGO partners to discuss supplies, services and protection. The council’s goal is to build a continuous humanitarian network, led by Sudanese, that stems from the same spirit of solidarity and volunteerism as the ERRs.³⁶

The organisation mechanisms of ERRs have not been without criticism. Some have suggested that coordination between states is limited,³⁷ and that the diffuse structure can be sometimes chaotic, lacking definitive leadership.³¹ ERR volunteer Hamza countered this criticism saying:

Every decision is subjected to a lot of discussion, a lot of people weighing in… in the end, if there is mutual agreement on something, it passes. If it’s being contested, it goes to a vote – like any other parliament.

This way of working, Hamza suggested, supported a democratic process and cross-learning.

Day-to-day activities

ERR activities are shaped by neighbourhood-level assessments of needs and capabilities, and the activities are often funded by local philanthropy or diaspora support.¹⁶ Due to the ongoing war, many volunteers described how approaches remain flexible and adaptable to allow the ERRs to respond to the myriad of challenges confronted.

Volunteer Amal detailed how expanding needs brought expanded capacities:

We started getting food supplies complaints [and] evacuation complaints. At that time, until the first week of the war, we are working alone. We are paying from our own pockets…it’s through mutual aid. Then we bring some professionals, like pharmacists, like doctors, like psychosocial supporters and like gender specialists…those people helped to bring medicine, a rape protocol and connected us with [other] doctors.

Additional volunteers coordinate or participate in activities from outside Sudan. For example, as many of the outside volunteers have activist origins, their successful use of social media in previous organising campaigns has proved useful. Describing the use of the internet, Noor said: ‘Some of them are outside, but they’re working through the network. People, mostly youths, are working by raising awareness, helping [with] donation [of time and resources]’.

The inclusion of volunteers outside Sudan in the work of ERRs was described as innovative and necessary – partly because so many volunteers have been displaced by the war. However, volunteers also noted how communicating with people from outside Sudan is increasingly challenging, especially in besieged areas where access to the internet is often difficult.

Risks, adaptations and visions for the future

The benefits that ERRs offer for aid distribution in a restricted humanitarian space are clear. However, threats to life and well-being are common. Interviewed volunteers detailed targeted attacks, repeated displacement, arrests, extortion, threats and accusations of espionage by both warring parties. The July 2024 report by Human Rights Watch detailed widespread atrocities, including sexual violence against women,³⁸ which ERR volunteers also detailed.

In addition to the physical tolls of a protracted war, uncertainty and scarcity, there is a psychological toll. Volunteers reported considerable mental health and well-being effects including anxiety, depression, insomnia and loss of appetite.

Contrasting descriptions – the hope of ERRs alongside the horrors of war – were often articulated. Describing the pressures working from outside Sudan to continue supporting the ERRs after being forced to leave her home, Amal said:

It was very hard to adapt. With a new situation, with no work, and a completely grey horizon. Yeah, I’m so sorry to say this, but I have to share this detail with you… Then, at the same time, we kept working on the Emergency Response Room, providing food and aid to people! This was hard, it was extremely hard.

One approach to reduce the physical, if not psychological, risks for ERR volunteers in-country includes navigating contested spaces adaptively. Working across Sudan in areas controlled by SAF or RSF, volunteers highlighted how they must position themselves differently in some neighbourhoods to help safeguard their lives and continue their work in these military zones.

Amal shared: ‘adaptation comes from the context itself …It depends on which localities [are] controlled by SAF or RSF, or sometimes [they are] controlled by both’. She went on to acknowledge the highly political nature of the registration of humanitarian entities in Sudan (see Box 2), saying that for her locality’s ERR: ‘we cannot be under [either party’s] control… they are going to prevent us from taking money [and] serving people on the ground’.

Box 2. A note on registration of humanitarian and development entities

Humanitarian and development entities, both international and national, are required to register with a government body to ensure legitimacy and receive permission for activities. In Sudan, historically, the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) has been this body. The HAC is currently controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces with their de facto capitol assembled in Port Sudan. In opposition, the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) has established its own registering body in its areas of control. This entity is called the Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations (SARHO).

Source: Author’s own. Sources cited.

Many people have concerns that government structures of the warring parties could disrupt the work of grassroots groups – such as by introducing bureaucratic requirements that are unattainable or even taint the group’s independence and dictate aid to serve their own agenda.³⁹ Considering conflict dynamics in certain areas – such as Darfur, where denying specific groups of food and other assistance is used to drive populations out⁴⁰ – this may be a notable challenge for local response.

It is due to these concerns that ERRs have approached registration in different ways across the countryreflecting each ERR’s context and internal debates.¹⁶

Volunteers acknowledged the complexities of their own history and local perspectives that affect how their work might be viewed. Speaking to how his ERR differentiates itself from the previous aims of Resistance Committees, Mutasim said: ‘We do not mix it with politics. We have learned to work with both sides of the conflict without taking sides…Mixing politics with our humanitarian work would stop our efforts and prevent us from helping people.’

Other interviewees acknowledged that while maintaining neutrality could be difficult on a personal level for frontline humanitarians – especially after witnessing or experiencing threats and harm by parties to the conflict – it remained essential for continued service delivery in volatile areas. In the words of Aziza:

At the end of the day, we are doing the work because there is no one else who will do it if we stop. What we are doing is not relating to political stuff…We want just to help our people.

Despite these risks and reported setbacks (such as soup kitchen closures,⁴¹ targeting of aid workers⁴² and network outages⁴³), interviewed ERR members were resolute in pressing ahead and overcoming challenges. Envisioning their role as going beyond service provision was a motivating force for this commitment. This has been echoed in other publications, which point to the potential of ERR programmes (such as communal kitchens) to strengthen social cohesion and gender equality while simultaneously addressing acute needs.⁴⁴

True to the origins of the ERRs, many volunteers labelled their work as a collective activism that has no ‘off’ hours. Amal explained this dedication by saying:

All that I have in my hands to give to Sudan and its people, I’ll give until the last day of my life. Not me, not only Amal. All of this generation are of the same mind. We are the generation who led the revolution, and we are the generation who will lead this country to peace. Inshallah.

Many volunteers drew hope from the ERRs’ practice of local decision-making and their potential to bring people together and expand a solidarity movement. Naila illustrated this saying: ‘When you see the ERRs, it’s like a local government! It’s the first response… it is now fully distributed across Sudan, among different states of Sudan, it’s amazing. I never imagined that one day it would be like this.’

These hopes were shared by Noor who said: ‘The ERR is like community. People at different levels feel connected. The poor and rich and so on… They have the same service, it unites people.’

Interplay between ERRs and IHDAs

Humanitarian aid in Sudan has reached only a small fraction of those in need, having been hindered by widespread insecurity and the political and logistical constraints imposed on humanitarian organisations.⁴⁵ In December 2023, research indicated that only 16% of aid was able to reach those in need, with access most restricted in the besieged Khartoum, Darfur and Kordofan states.⁴⁵

ERRs, operating in the same challenging environment, face their own distinct obstacles. As their localised aid model gained traction across Sudan, their needs grew, and they quickly became overstretched. Currently, ERRs remain under-resourced. This limits their ability to deliver aid effectively.

Recognising these challenges, complementary work between IHDAs and ERRs has become a means to deliver life-saving care, but the process of building partnerships is challenging. IHDAs typically require registration by partners as a mechanism of clearance (see Box 2), but most ERRs are unregistered. Formal collaboration between IHDAs and ERRs is also difficult because IHDAs are hesitant to speak openly about such collaboration for fear that the de facto government may further block their already tenuous access.

Navigation of these relationships was discussed with IHDAs and ERR volunteers. Interviewees foregrounded trust-building, complexities of partnership and exploring different approaches to working together. These topics are discussed below.

Mutual trust?

Despite their grassroots origins, many ERRs never intended to work alone and had planned from the outset to partner with national and international aid organisations.³¹ Yet, some external organisations have questioned the neutrality and accountability of the ERRs since the beginning. Nevertheless, ERRs have gradually built trusting relationships with staff from some IHDAs. This has been aided by their clear organisational structure as well as their perceived legitimacy and proven accountability to neighbours in need.

Illustrating how ERRs have had to ‘prove themselves’ through action rather than more formal clearance or registration mechanisms, Marcus, an international aid worker, said:

The ERRs have been under examination for the first eight months of their operation, and they still are in part. I think they did themselves a favour in being legitimate, in proving that what they were saying, is what they were actually doing.

ERRs, however, see this need to prove themselves as a double standard because they do not have the opportunity to review the IHDAs in the same way. ERR volunteers stated that they did not think microscopic examination was appropriate in an emergency response and raised the important point that it did not help to build a two-way partnership based on trust.

In reference to how frustrating this could be, Hamza said:

I answer questions about who we are, what we’re doing, how we’re doing [and] our accountability methods… While I spent two hours explaining things, I ended up not having time to talk about what I came to talk about, which is we need support….

Complexities of partnership

From the start, ERRs have been largely self-funded and supported by diaspora. However, since late 2023, ERRs have gained increasing international recognition, and IHDAs have been attempting to coordinate with them and provide support. For example, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) has a pooled funding mechanism, the Sudan Humanitarian Fund,⁴⁶ which has provided small grants directly to ERRs and other aid groups that partner with ERRs.⁴⁵

Although this added financial and other support proved beneficial, interviewed volunteers also described two key limitations and tensions: (a) indirect, inflexible and inconsistent funding; and (b) time-consuming reporting obligations.

From the perspective of ERR volunteers, financial support was often indirect (i.e., it was channelled through NGOs) and inflexible (i.e., it was earmarked for a certain sector response). They also noted that inconsistent funding affected the sustainability of activities and led to soup kitchen closures,⁴¹ which had a catastrophic effect given the food crisis.

Volunteers also described how donor reporting and accountability mechanisms are not only onerous but also a mismatch with ERRs’ mechanisms that are based on communal neighbourhood accountability. Hamza elaborated saying: ‘We’re getting really little money for the ERRs, but too much compliance and too much reporting stuff. That I think, is the biggest challenge.’

The IHDAs employees interviewed shared a similar observation adding that the lack of consistency in due diligence and reporting mechanisms across IHDAs increased the workload for ERRs. Illustrating current approaches, Marcus shared: ‘[Most I/NGOs] kind of apply a simplified methodology to work with [ERRs], but these methodologies are not unified. This is confusing [and] not helping the [partnership] process.’

Volunteers shared that sorting through various requirements and providing what is needed can exhaust ERR resources and demoralise their spirit.

This IHDA-led approach to partnership has been criticised before, noting that if local groups are rendered more accountable to their international partners than to their locality, the IHDA runs the risk of unintentionally undermining the local actors.⁴⁷

However, beyond the difficulties outlined above, volunteers also shared that the training and coordination support they received has become integral to their work. Mutasim, a volunteer in an ERR protection office, emphasised how local and international knowledge and capacities can work in complementary ways. He detailed how his team’s training with an international NGO enhanced the ERR’s security mechanisms for evacuation. This combined well with ERRs’ local knowledge and understanding of a neighbourhood’s expectations.

Another benefit of the partnerships has been that some ERRs have enhanced their credibility on the international stage. For example, recognition from partnering IHDAs has gained Khartoum State ERR representatives ‘a seat at the table’ in wider humanitarian circles and with international governments that provide aid.^48,49

Opportunities for localisation

The interviewed IHDA employees valued the potential for creative and complimentary ways of working with ERRs and the potential for meaningful localisation. Describing the new push to channel resources to ERRs, Jacob said:

So it’s a localisation effort we’re applying, I think it’s the first time it’s being applied in this sort of conflict setting to this kind of response. It will be interesting to see how that plays out, but I’m really optimistic about it.

The optimism by IHDAs is encouraging although it is important that expectations for ERRs or other civilian actors are not raised too high.⁴⁴ Notably, IHDAs should consider vulnerable sections of society which may be neglected if engagement is only restricted to well-established groups.⁴⁴ For example, because many local responses (including ERRs) are rooted in previous relationships, there is risk of exclusion – where greater support is shown to some over others.⁵⁰ This is not new and has been seen in other global crisis responses too.¹³

Local actors, while well placed to respond, are inevitably more embedded in local political and conflict dynamics.⁵¹ Acknowledging this and appreciating the history of long-standing state efforts to co-opt and politicise civil society, caution has been advised, with some reports noting that engagement with local groups in Sudan are inevitably politically fraught.⁴⁵

With this in mind, careful partner assessment has been urged.⁵⁰ IHDAs need to recognise that there can be great variation in the capacities and operational procedures of ERRs and other local responders, including their level of trust and the amount of local participation in the places they serve.⁵⁰ Despite these important considerations, taking action to work beyond these challenges – especially given the scale of response required – was still encouraged by national and international actors alike.⁴⁵

There was consensus among staff from IHDAs and ERR volunteers interviewed about treading carefully in the collaboration process for other reasons, including key concerns around the co-option or ‘NGOification’ of ERRs, unequal risk distribution and ‘empty’ partnerships. Speaking frankly, Marcus shared how he believes the challenges faced in Sudan today need to be a wake-up call for the system. He said: ‘if it wasn’t for the lack of access, I think today we would be talking about a completely different story…with accessibility to all the country, [the system] would have continued to do business as usual.’ Thinking ahead, Marcus went on to say:

I think potentially we have a huge opportunity to make [this experience] become revolutionary for the [system]. In the sense of being a case study that can be applied and transferred to other realities as well, with obviously all the changes and adjustments…I think this is the first time in which we and the international community in general, are actually doing localisation.

However, interviewed staff from IHDAs also stressed there is a risk that opportunities here will be neglected. Firstly, the ERRs, while demonstrating an innovative model of locally driven aid, could lose traction quickly without meaningful and timely engagement with IHDAs. Secondly, if IHDAs do not learn from their experience with the ERRs and apply this model in other responses, gains in how to ethically localise humanitarian and development action in practical ways might be lost. Finally, and most importantly, millions of civilians will suffer if opportunities for large-scale, coordinated responses through mutual aid in Sudan and elsewhere are not followed through.

Marcus expressed his concerns pointedly saying: ‘My biggest fear is that in the humanitarian setting, you go through trends and popular and “sexy” topics. Now the ERRs are sexy. My fear is that tomorrow they won’t be anymore.’

References

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Authors: This brief was written by Samantha K. Olson (London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, LSHTM, [email protected], ORCID ID: 0009-0003-9192-2923), Maysoon Dahab (LSHTM, [email protected], ORCID ID: 0000-0002-4271-9705) and Melissa Parker (LSHTM, [email protected], ORCID ID: 0000-0003-0829-2741)

Authors’ note: This case study includes many quotes aimed at amplifying the voices and perspectives from all contributing participants. It draws on research which focused on ERR volunteers’ experiences and, inevitably, other local responder voices are absent. Additionally, while ERR interviewees are from different areas in Sudan, their experiences cannot be seen as representative of all volunteers.

Note on funding: The Bureau of Humanitarian Affairs (BHA) and the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) helped to support this work as part of financial assistance award U01GH002319.

Acknowledgements: This case study is based on qualitative research conducted with ERR volunteers and international humanitarian and development staff involved in the response. We thank them for their time and perspectives. Collaboration with The Sudan Research Group at LSHTM and consultation and dedicated time by Research Fellow Rahaf Abu Koura further enhanced this research.

Internal reviews were made by Professor Leben Moro (Juba University) and Dr Diane Duclos (LSHTM). External reviews were made by Rawh Nasir (freelance journalist, researcher and ERR volunteer) and Hassan-Alattar Satti (freelance research consultant who worked previously for international non-governmental organisations in Sudan). Editorial support was provided by Nicola Ball and Harriet MacLehose (SSHAP editorial team). This brief is the responsibility of SSHAP.

Suggested citation: Olson, S.K., Dahab, M., and Parker, M. (2024). Key Considerations: Mutual aid lessons and experiences from Emergency Response Rooms in Sudan. Social Science in Humanitarian Action (SSHAP). www.doi.org/10.19088/SSHAP.2024.056

Published by the Institute of Development Studies: October 2024.

Copyright: © Institute of Development Studies 2024. This is an Open Access paper distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International licence (CC BY 4.0). Except where otherwise stated, this permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original authors and source are credited and any modifications or adaptations are indicated.

Contact: If you have a direct request concerning the brief, tools, additional technical expertise or remote analysis, or should you like to be considered for the network of advisers, please contact the Social Science in Humanitarian Action Platform by emailing Annie Lowden ([email protected]) or Juliet Bedford ([email protected]).

About SSHAP: The Social Science in Humanitarian Action (SSHAP) is a partnership between the Institute of Development Studies, Anthrologica , CRCF Senegal, Gulu University, Le Groupe d’Etudes sur les Conflits et la Sécurité Humaine (GEC-SH), the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine, the Sierra Leone Urban Research Centre, University of Ibadan, and the University of Juba. This work was supported by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and Wellcome 225449/Z/22/Z. The views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the funders, or the views or policies of the project partners.

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